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    Between disinterest and inequality: Perceptions of brokers and actors involved about the implementation of forest policies at the subnational level
    (Universidad de los Andes, Colombia, 2024-07-01)
    Objective/context: In 2020, Ucayali was the Peruvian region with the highest loss of Amazonian forest (47,267 hectares). Measures have been taken regarding climate commitments and environmental governance, but the results continue without notoriety, and mitigation actions are limited. From a subnational approach, the article seeks to analyze the perceptions of brokers and actors involved about the implementation of forest policies in the Ucayali region. Methodology: Based on a qualitative strategy that included semi-structured interviews and a co-construction workshop to evidence the perceptions of the actors involved, with direct knowledge of the territory and implementation, and intermediary agents (brokers), the latter with the capacity to influence the decisions made regarding the formulation of action plans. Conclusions: The results demonstrate the existence of a structural difficulty in achieving short- or long-term change actions. There are institutional limitations but also a lack of support from civil society. Originality: Considering the type and limited number of studies on perceptions of climate change-oriented policies, the results obtained allow for generating relevant evidence for policy formulation processes and articulation between different levels of government.
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    When electoral reforms backfire: reassessing reelection's impact on corruption
    (Springer Science+Business Media, 2026-01-01)
    This article evaluates the effect of prohibiting immediate reelection of subnational authorities in Peru on incentives for engaging in corruption through public procurement and investment expenditure. Using quantitative indicators derived from public contracting and investment expenditure data and applying interrupted time series models with fixed effects. Additionally, we conduct a placebo test, and sensitivity analysis across different reform timings, the study finds evidence suggesting that the reelection ban increased corruption risks at the subnational level. Specifically, the results show an increase in the percentage of projects with cost overruns and the proportion of expenditures executed through contracts below the supervision threshold of the State Contracting Supervisory Body (OSCE). These findings support predictions from the electoral accountability model, which argues that the possibility of reelection incentivizes politicians to align their preferences with those of citizens and refrain from rentseeking behavior. Overall, this study highlights the importance of considering not only electoral incentives in designing anti-corruption policies but also broader institutional and organizational reforms.