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Item type:Publication, Nietzsche: Experimental Skepticism and the Question of Values(Springer, 2020-10-19)After presenting the general state of the field regarding Nietzsche and skepticism in specialized studies, I explain why it is essential to contextualize this topic through a comparative analysis of Human, All Too Human and Beyond Good and Evil. Both books raise the issue of skepticism in relation to the possibility of knowledge, the end of metaphysics, and the problem of values. Nietzsche seeks to overcome epistemological skepticism by means of an alliance between philosophy and history in the so-called intermediate books Daybreak and The Gay Science, and then concludes in Beyond Good and Evil that skepticism is a good instrument in the pursuit of knowledge and of that which has value, and that precisely skepticism, as an instrument, is essential for philosophy, which is nonetheless responsible for not being skeptical about what has value. - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Sobre el conocimiento de la cosa en sí según Schopenhauer(Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, 2020-04-15)This paper proposes to analyze Schopenhauer’s methodological and hermeneutical considerations regarding the knowledge of the thing-in-itself. For this purpose, I explain the nature of the philosophical abstraction in light of the primacy of the metaphysics of the Will. I argue that the possibility of the philosophical research is rooted on the interpretation of self-knowledge as an instance of the Will’s objectivation. In this regard, I will plead that the definition and criteria developed by Schopenhauer for his philosophy are established at the expense of deductive demonstration, in favor of a peculiar and particular form of abstraction fitted for the philosophical enterprise and subject matter. Finally, I will present an interpretation of the epistemological basis of reflection in line with schopenhauerian philosophy. - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, La objetividad de los valores en Husserl y Scheler. Una “disputa fenomenológica”(2021-02-11)De modo general, la posición de Husserl respecto de Scheler se puede resumir como el rechazo a una “metafísica ingenua”. Del otro lado, la posición de este respecto del fundador de la fenomenología se puede caracterizar como desaprobación al “giro trascendental” y al privilegio del pensar sobre el sentir y valorar. Pese a estas diferencias irreconciliables, Husserl y Scheler coinciden no solo en la defensa de la objetividad de los valores. En este texto, quisiéramos delinear los trazos generales de lo que sería una disputa fenomenológica entre Husserl y Scheler respecto de la objetividad axiológica con el fin de mostrar cómo sus análisis coinciden y divergen.In general terms, Husserl’s position regarding Scheler can be summarized as the rejection of a “naive metaphysics”. On the other hand, Scheler’s position regarding the father of Phenomenology can be presented as the disapproval of the “transcendental turn” and of the priority of thought over feeling and valuing. In spite of these irreconcilable differences, Husserl and Scheler agree in the defence of the objectivity of values. In this paper, we will try to draw some general guidelines of what a phenomenological dispute between Husserl and Scheler concerning the objectivity of values would be like in order to show how theirs analyses coincide, and disagree. - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, El camino del filósofo. Husserl y el sentido de la ética(2021-02-22)Las reflexiones de Husserl sobre la ética se caracterizan por el intento de hacer de ella una ciencia, pero terminan con la subordinación de los problemas éticos a la metafísica. Tomando como hilo conductor la reflexión husserliana sobre la ética en tanto Kunstlehre, el artículo intenta mostrar cómo el sentido y ámbito de la ética se van ampliando hasta el punto de que su subordinación a la metafísica responde al carácter ético que ha de tener la existencia del mundo y de la humanidad. Con este fin, seguimos el camino que va de la fundación estática de la ética de la primera lección de 1914 a la fundación genética de las lecciones de 1920/24 y terminamos con la consideración de dos textos del inicio de los años treinta en los que Husserl retoma la argumentación de estas últimas lecciones.Husserl’s meditations on ethics are characterized by his attempt to configure it as science, but they end by subordinating ethical problems to metaphysics. Starting by Husserl’s reflection on ethics as Kunstlehre, this paper attempts to show how the sense and scope of ethics expands to the point that its subordination to metaphysics responds to the ethical character that the world and humanity’s existence should both have. With this in view, this paper follows the path that leads from the static foundation of ethics in the first 1914 lessons, to its genetic foundation in the 1920/24 lessons. It concludes considering two texts from the beginning of the 1930’s, whereby Husserl deals again with the arguments of the latter lessons. - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Revisiting Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology of the ego: Existence and praxis(Springer Nature, 2022-01-01)Two views have characterized the mainstream reception of Husserl’s work based on his lifetime’s publications. One considers his method and philosophy as primarily theoretical and dependent on the Cartesian paradigm. The other regards his eidetic method as caught in a “logicism of essences.” Both endured after Husserl’s 1936 Crisis and the later publications of his Nachlass. Thus the view has prevailed that his work was unable to address questions concerning concrete existence, historical facticity, ethical life, and metaphysical problems. Offsetting this view, this paper examines the origin and underlying arguments of these two interpretations and attempts to shed new light on both. In doing so, the paper accomplishes two tasks. First, it uncovers the eminently practical nature of Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity as a functioning active (constitutive) ego. Second, it reveals the existential roots of his transcendental ego. Both approaches stand together, and their upshot is a non-conventional, “unitary,” interpretation of Husserl’s work. - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Filosofía de la religión como crítica breve ensayo sobre las tareas fundamentales de la filosofía de la religión(Universidad Femenina del Sagrado Corazón, 2022-07-05)This article uses the tension between the unconditioned and the conditioned that Kant detects in the human being and that he presents in the Critique of Pure Reason in order to account for the internal dynamics of the philosophy of religion. In this sense, the work presents the way in which Kant leaves behind dogmatic metaphysics to give way to another, which is the result of the "constriction of reason". Next, the ways in which an attempt is made to condition the unconditioned are presented, both in the case of freedom, in that of thought and in that of spiritual life. The solution to the problem that Kant detects is offered in the abandonment of rational theology and the passage to the resources of critical philosophy, phenomenology, pragmatism or critical theory. - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, De la eternidad al flujo: apuntes para pensar una filosofía primera desde la temporalidad(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2024-12-10)The following paper attempts to show an overview of the ways in which the concept of “first philosophy” has been appropriated during the history of Western philosophy, first as metaphysics and then as transcendental philosophy. It is maintained that this transformation is accompanied by a paradigm shift in the understanding of time: as an element whose explanation requires its overcoming of eternity as a self-founding original dimension. Likewise, it is argued why this transformation maintains the same guiding thread in the philosophical motives that are found within the concept of “first philosophy” itself.