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Item type:Publication, “Constitutional” public policy making in context: the peruvian experience(2021-01-01)In this article the authors will identify how the reform of the “new” Peruvian Constitution policy was implemented, with particular emphasis on the influence of the Constitutional Court of Peru. At last, using the theory of public choice, we will present three cases that allow them to conclude that the Peruvian Constitution does not reflect a particular ideology but rather a mix of values that can be opportunistically used by interest groups. The first example deals with the regulation of the education, health and social security sectors. In this case, the authors conclude that the regulation is mercantilist. The second example deals with the “stabilization acts” for foreign investment contracts. In practice, this provision was used to concede a legal monopoly to Telefonica, a telecommunications company. Finally, our third case refers to the treatment of natural resources. In accordance to the Constitution, natural resources are property of the State, not the owner of the land. This anti-market provision has caused economic losses and social conflicts. - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, How much local autonomy is good for a city? An analysis of the Peruvian constitutional design for cities and its effects in the case of the Lima Metropolitan Area(Springer, 2021-01-01)The decentralization reform that started in Peru in 2002, which divided the country into regions, provinces and districts, was initially regarded as a just and long-postponed project. However, while the constitution grants all local governments political, economic and administrative autonomy, the rapid population growth many cities have experienced since then calls for the reevaluation of the whole design. This is especially the case for the Lima Metropolitan Area, of which the population has more than doubled since the 1980s. This chapter analyses the effects that being divided into various autonomous districts can have for the governance of a metropolis. We argue that the division causes practical difficulties for reasons rooted in the Peruvian constitutional design, and that this fragmentation hinders the provision of public services, reduces long-term planning and may cause spending inefficiencies. A reexamination of this flawed constitutional design for its cities could be the first step for Peru to finally adapt to its new urban reality as well as to keep up with future changes.