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    False consensus: the ghost of good faith under article 7(1) of the CISG
    (Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina, 2022-01-01)
    Good faith is one the matters that divides Civil Law from Common Law systems and is a starting point to discuss on the underlying philosophy found behind the pro-good faith and anti-good faith approaches. Taking this context into consideration, the CISG adopted a restrictive model of good faith (Common Law-friendly, in principle) and so it was expressed in its text, being article 7(1) the only provision that makes reference to good faith and regarding the interpretation of the CISG. However, since it was a false consensus, the story did not end there, and the ghost of civilian good faith continues to haunt the CISG facilities, and thus, even if it is not physically present, its presence could be felt through the lex mercatoria pursuant to article 9 CISG.
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    La compleja comprensión del artículo 12 de la Convención sobre los Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad [versión accesible para lectura con JAWS]
    (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2022-08-04)
    The adoption and implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities drastically changed the understanding of the rights of persons with disabilities. The right to legal capacity (or legal agency) of persons with disabilities stands out, among other issues needed for its implementation. The Convention recognizes that persons with disabilities can make decisions and their disability is not ground for denying legal capacity. This goes against what most Civil Codes state in our region. To guarantee said right, it is necessary that States recognize support for legal capacity that are guarded by safeguards. These will prevent abuse, undue influence and conflict of interest. This article presents the different debates that have occurred at the theoretical level regarding these new institutions. Article 12 forces us to rethink several legal terms such as the juridical act and its grounds for voidness and voidability; informed consent or unfitness to plead.
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    La protección de la imagen personal frente a la Inteligencia Artificial: Apuntes desde el derecho constitucional y el derecho civil peruano
    (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2025-12-19)
    The development of Artificial Intelligence has led to an increase in the dissemination and alteration of people’s physical appearance through deepfakes, which has become a recurring problem today. In this regard, the present article aimed to provide a comprehensive overview of how the right to one’s personal image is affected by the use of this technology, adapting its essential content to the new dilemmas of the digital age. Finally, it sought to show how the Peruvian legal system, through civil and constitutional law, has established mechanisms of protection to safeguard personal image adequately, which may be applied in cases of harm caused by deepfakes.
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    ¿Se debe aplicar el Tercer Pleno Casatorio Civil en las indemnizaciones por nulidad matrimonial? Apuntes para una mejor comprensión de las pretensiones indemnizatorias en materia matrimonial
    (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2025-08-27)
    Peruvian family law allows, in cases of divorce, the ancillary discussion of awarding compensation to a given spouse if certain circumstances are met. Nevertheless, despite the contributions made by case law and legal scholarship, the Supreme Court continues to misinterpret the compensation regimes applicable to divorce. Accordingly, this article seeks to delineate the application of compensation in cases of divorce due to de facto separation (Art. 345-A of the Civil Code) from the compensation established for cases of fault-based divorce (Art. 351 of the same law), which also applies to cases of marriage annulment. Thus, considering the different nature of these two types of divorce -remedy or sanction- that may give rise to compensation, as well as the distinct purposes pursued by these legal mechanisms -redress of damages caused by the culpable spouse or compensation for the economic imbalance suffered by the more disadvantaged spouse -it is concluded that it is necessary to distinguish the applicable rules in each case, in order to grant greater consistency not only to the provisions established by case law in the Third Plenary Session, but also to the norms set forth in our legal system regarding family law.
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