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    Political–economic determinants of external import protection under a preferential trade agreement
    (Cambridge University Press, 2021-12-02)
    The stalling of WTO multilateralism and the proliferation of preferential trade agreements in recent decades have drawn substantial attention to the impacts of preferential liberalization. A critical question is how they affect the trade barriers imposed against outsiders. I examine the relationship between preferential trade liberalization and protection against non-member countries by testing the predictions of a political–economy model based on the previous literature. Focusing on a specific model allows me to uncover the mechanisms via which preferential liberalization affects external import protection, whereas most of the existing literature has focused on establishing the sign of the effect only. Furthermore, I focus on not only tariffs, as most studies do, but also on the temporary trade barriers of antidumping and safeguards. I test the predictions for Latin America and obtain results that provide solid evidence supporting two mechanisms from the theory, which lead to lower protection against non-members of a preferential trade agreement. First, a lower preferential import protection level means that the increase in preferential imports from increasing the external tariff creates a smaller increase in tariff revenue. Second, as preferential import protection is cut, there is a decrease in the markup and sales of domestic firms, and thus raising the external import protection generates less profit. Moreover, this second effect is present when the political motivation of the government is sufficiently strong.
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    Intra-bloc tariffs and preferential margins in trade agreements
    (RELX Group (Netherlands), 2021-01-01)
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    Intra-bloc tariffs and preferential margins in trade agreements
    (Elsevier B.V., 2022-09-01)
    We study how countries choose intra-bloc tariffs and preferential margins in Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). Our model indicates that countries should set systematically lower preferential margins when the bloc takes the form of a free trade area, relative to a customs union. Moreover, in customs unions (but not necessarily in free trade areas) preferential margins should increase with the supply of partner countries and decrease with the level of preferential imports. These relationships reflect, respectively, the internalization of political-economy goals within the bloc and the desire to curb trade diversion. Using a sample that covers most PTAs formed by Latin American countries in the 1990s, we find empirical support for each of those predictions. These findings rationalize why governments often keep intra-bloc duties strictly positive. We show that this tends to worsen the welfare consequences of PTAs, and that requiring the elimination of internal tariffs would be socially desirable.
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    The impact of free trade agreements on the tariffs of nonmember countries: evidence from NAFTA
    (Springer Science+Business Media, 2026-01-12)
    How do free trade agreements (FTAs) affect the tariffs imposed by nonmember countries? In light of the significant attention devoted to and the proliferation of FTAs in recent decades, this is a critical yet mostly overlooked question. Using a political-economy model of trade protection, I show theoretically that if the political bias of the governments is large enough, an FTA will cause an increase in the tariffs of nonmembers via a larger supply and higher profit rise generated by those tariffs. I test and confirm the model’s predictions focusing on the case of the North American Free Trade Agreement. The results highlight a new type of mechanism through which FTAs may affect the tariffs of nonmember countries and world welfare.