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Judicial review without shortcuts: A vindication of the knower from a pragmatist and critical theoretical approach
(SAGE Publishing, 2020-12-04)
In my article, I want to focus on the critique Cristina Lafont makes to expertocracy and epistocracy, mainly through the institution of judicial review, to which she dedicates chapter 7 and part of chapter 6 of her book Democracy without Shortcuts. First I will reconstruct the premises that support her arguments in favour of a democratic reading of judicial review. Then, I will pose some questions about its viability as an institution that favours the participation of the citizens in the shaping and the determination of the scope of the norms they are subjected to.
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The epistemic foundations of injustice: lessons from the Young Marx
(Springer Nature, 2021-12-01)
This article intends to show to what extent the early Marxian categories of alienation, ideology and proletariat can serve to better understand current forms of epistemic injustice, as well as, conversely, how the latter can illuminate some unclear aspects of such concepts. In the first part, it will be explained the extent to which Marx’s concept of alienation accounts for the experience of an individual in a world to whose norms she is subject, but which she cannot recognise as her own. It will be shown that Marx finds the answer in a form of emancipatory praxis linked to a transformative appropriation of social reality. In order to deepen the understanding of this idea of emancipation, the second part will analyse the Marxian concept of the proletariat. It will be argued that taking up some considerations about the Hegelian figure of the rabble, Marx distinguishes a “liberal” from a “human” form of emancipation. In the third part, a contemporary example will be used to show the usefulness of the young Marx’s analyses concerning this dimension of emancipation struggles. In the fourth part, these ideas will be developed further through the concept of epistemic injustice, which has gained great importance in the recent studies that Critical Theory carries out of the different socio-epistemic blocks of an ideological nature that prevent articulating, communicating and overcoming negative experiences that hinder individual self-realisation. In this sense, it will be shown the importance of the Marxian categories of alienation and ideology to theoretically address current forms of epistemic injustice, and, in relation to this, it will be explained the transformative and constitutive function of the excluded in the creation of new sectors of reality through which their demands can be met.
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Social criticism, dissonance, and progress: A socio-epistemic approach
(SAGE Publishing, 2022-03-23)
The immanent approach adopted by most contemporary representatives of the Critical Theory tradition has generally the purpose of offering a foundation for social criticism that, without relying exclusively on explicit or factually accepted principles, avoids both the potential arbitrariness of subjective judgment and the appeal to transcendent criteria. However, this project has not yet paid much attention to the socio-epistemic elements related to the intersubjective praxis of criticism. Based on this concern, I intend to explore the possibility of immanent criticism by using the epistemic category of dissonance. I will begin by showing how Davidson’s notion of irrationality can overcome the problematic separation between healthy and pathological behavior found in Festinger’s classical theory of cognitive dissonance and serve as an indicator of epistemic contradictions that can lead to social change. Thereafter, I will explain the link between these approaches and both Brandom’s inferential semantics and Honneth’s normative reconstruction. At the end of the first part, I expect to show an articulated picture of how dissonance can serve as a key for the analysis of inconsistencies present both in the belief systems and in the institutions and practices that constitute forms of life. In the second part, I will reconstruct three possible objections to this comprehensive approach in relation to the role of the individual in processes of social criticism and to the notions of progress and rationality that the approach adopts. I will analyze here what kind of meta-criterion is necessary to overcome the discomfort generated by the experience of dissonance so that it leads to social change. Taking up the Hegelian-Pragmatist idea of accumulation of experiences, I will argue that such a meta-criterion refers to the possibility of gathering and using available and non-endogenous socio-epistemic resources that allow reconfiguring the foundations of the questioned form of life.
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Una aproximación inferencialista-expresivista al reconocimiento patológico. Nuevas luces sobre un viejo problema
(Universidad de Chile, 2023-08-01)
Como afirmara Althusser y recapitulara Axel Honneth años más tarde, a toda relación de reconocimiento le es intrínseco un lado reproductivo, puesto que esta debe darse sobre el trasfondo de valores existentes que sean comunes a quien reconoce y a quien es reconocido. Tomando en cuenta esto, la pregunta no es si puede haber en general relaciones de reconocimiento sin un propósito reproductivo. El problema radica, más bien, en averiguar si, a pesar de su dimensión reproductiva, el reconocimiento puede cumplir también un rol constitutivo que responda a la capacidad de los agentes de generar conocimiento. Mientras lo común es abordar el problema desde una crítica a la ideología, mi punto de partida será directamente la pregunta acerca de bajo qué condiciones es positiva una relación tan claramente orientada a mantener la obediencia por medio de la autosatisfacción. En la primera sección, distinguiré dos órdenes de normatividad asociados a las prácticas de reconocimiento, donde el primero se refiere al sistema de valores y creencias vigente y el segundo, a las reglas que definen el status de agente epistémico. En la segunda sección analizaré el rol que cumplen ambos órdenes des- de una aproximación inferencialista-expresivista con la cual evitar el problema de la autoridad de la conciencia individual como fuente de legitimación de las luchas por el reconocimiento. En la tercera sección, finalmente, me centraré en la función de dichas luchas y responderé a la pregunta central del trabajo mostrando, con Hegel, que el camino para superar la dimensión puramente reproductiva del reconocimiento replica el movimiento que permite superar la escasa relevancia epistémico-práctica que posee el saber inmediato, propio de la certeza subjetiva.
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Marxism, Pragmatism and the Precedents of Mariátegui's Critical Thought. Reflections on the Emergence of Social Criticism in Peru
(2025-01-01)
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Hijacked: How Neoliberalism Turned the Work Ethic Against Workers and How Workers Can Take It Back
(Wiley, 2025-02-20)
In her most recent book, Hijacked: How Neoliberalism Turned the Work Ethic Against Workers and How Workers Can Take It Back, political philosopher Elizabeth Anderson meticulously examines the historical evolution of the work ethic. Through this analysis, she highlights essential insights necessary to counteract the prevailing neoliberal trajectory. Anderson's examination reveals that, since the inception of work ethic in Puritan England, two distinct trends have emerged: one conservative and one progressive. The former has historically focused on associating poverty with idleness, advocating for punitive measures or compulsory reeducation rather than addressing the underlying cultural and economic factors perpetuating it. In contrast, Anderson champions the latter perspective, which places the worker at the forefront of public policy and social reform initiatives. In the initial chapters, Anderson elucidates how the foundation of work ethic can be traced back to the influential English theologian Richard Baxter. In the late 17th century, Baxter advocated for hard work as a “calling” of God and emphasized the importance of eschewing excessive ambition and laziness, regardless of social status. He stressed the prudent use of time and resources, alongside virtues like moderation, thrift, and altruism (p. 16). This Puritan ethical framework, later oversimplified by Max Weber as purely conservative in nature, was also reflected in the writings of Robert Sanderson, another theologian from the 17th century. Sanderson expanded on the salvific role of work by introducing novel concepts such as career selection based on personal strengths and an egalitarian approach that demanded equal ethical standards for all individuals regarding honest labor for societal welfare. Furthermore, Sanderson proposed concrete measures to safeguard workers against exploitation by employers through provisions for fair treatment, just wages, and adequate living conditions encompassing health and safety standards (p. 11). In chapter 3, Anderson elucidates how the Industrial Revolution, commencing at the close of the 18th century, led to a distinct separation between wage laborers and capitalists that resulted in a detrimental impact on the work ethic. The emergence of class distinctions brought about a divergence in the allocation of costs and benefits, something that Puritan ethics had until then been responsible for keeping in balance (p. 64). This secularization of the work ethic engendered an unequal sharing of hardships, burdening the disenfranchised with the sole responsibility for sacrifice and hard labor. Initially conceived as an ethical framework applicable to all types of work without regard to social class distinctions—a concept underpinned by a divine calling lacking such differentiation—the evolution toward liberalism saw a progressively conservative interpretation emerge. This interpretation increasingly favored the affluent elite and the “idle rich” over the impoverished labor force (p. 72). Anderson observes that the 20th century saw manifestations of both progressive and conservative ideologies, embodied by social democracy and neoliberalism, respectively. Social democracy, rooted in a reformist strand of Marxism from the late 19th and early 20th centuries, traces its intellectual lineage back to influential figures such as Paine, Condorcet, Locke, Smith, Ricardo, and Mill. Chapters 5 to 8 elaborate on how this ideology advocates for the equal treatment of all workers, the provision of social security and other essential labor benefits without discrimination, and the empowerment of workers through self-determination and self-governance. On the other hand, neoliberalism, expounded upon in chapters 3, 4, and 9, emerged from the philosophies of Priestley, Bentham, Malthus, Paley, Burke, and Whately. This ideology supports an economic system centered around shareholders where dignity is tied to self-sufficiency. Neoliberalism promotes notions of private charity as well as voluntary initiatives while endorsing policies that emphasize individual responsibility and fails to acknowledge that workers' fates are often influenced by decisions made by major stakeholders in society. According to Anderson, a worker-centered work ethic may be adapted to the challenges of the present by drawing inspiration from an alternative, de-ideologized economic history, such as the one she offers in her book. As a result, three long-forgotten issues should be reintroduced into political and economic research: the restructuring of the processes of production, exchange, and distribution of goods; the effect of work on the abilities, values, and dispositions that make up a full life; and the need to build cooperative and supportive human relationships in all spheres of social life, with a focus on the workplace, where these relationships have been more neglected (p. 288). In sum, for Anderson, the main lesson of the progressive work ethic tradition is that “the most important product of our economic system is ourselves” (p. 288), its current function being “to organize, recognize, and reward work so as to promote the well-being of the whole society in ways that promote the freedom, dignity, and well-being of each, along multiple dimensions of well-being” (p. 242). Anderson argues that society could benefit from a new kind of worker who—because of supportive and horizontal decision-making practices that permeate work relationships—is more accustomed to democracy and better equipped to participate in issues of public interest in addition to those pertaining to their own subsistence and quality of life. This progressive ethic suggests a shift in the normative viewpoint that, like Eduard Bernstein's social democratic program, should move “from the working class to the democratic nation of citizens” (p. 244). Therefore, it is no coincidence that Anderson views unions and cooperatives, due to their experimental nature, as means of democratizing the workplace to develop skills and strengthen capacities intended to establish a democratic and just society. In fact, Anderson states that “we will discover how to organize society so that it promotes the common good consistently with the freedom of each individual only through patient democratic experimentation,” which is in strict accordance with her prior works on John Dewey's pragmatist democracy and with Bernstein's theses reconstructed in chapter 8 (p. 241). A primary goal of Anderson's project is to show how contemporary neoliberal strategies replicate the priorities and methods of policies that, like the mid–19th-century Malthusian Poor Law, were founded on the criminalization of poverty and desert-based claims of distributive justice that are ideologically maintained and benefit the idle rich (p. 264). The recommodification and microdivision of labor, which seem impervious to criticism, are the two primary issues that characterize this tendency (pp. 169 and 248). Consequently, the main objective of social and political reforms ought to be the decommodification of labor or the removal of its status as a good that is determined by economic demand. Anderson's method is akin to Amartya Sen's capabilities approach in that it focuses on redefining the role of work from being market- and major company-oriented to focusing on the autonomous development of individuals and society as a whole. To “consider how access to material goods may be a prerequisite to the ability to work and exercise other virtues” (p. 262) should, therefore, be made possible by the progressive work ethic. The democratization of work and the necessary development of a progressive work ethic are fields in which Anderson's book marks a substantial advancement. But to reach its full potential, some of its assumptions need to be reexamined in light of those experiences that social philosophy and economic history have paid little attention to, despite the fact that they are fundamental to the functioning of the global economy. Anderson's normative claim is essentially based on the European narrative that work ethic currents have oscillated between progressive and conservative since the Industrial Revolution. According to the explanations provided in chapters 8 and 9, Europe transitioned from a predominance of social democratic ideas, which place a strong emphasis on social security and self-government, to a reconquest in the form of a welfare state after a brief interruption during World War II, and finally to what now seems to be the absolute reign of neoliberalism and the dismantling of the institutions of solidarity, with its epicenter in the United States. Regaining them would, therefore, make sense, but doing so would require adding a strengthened democratic component that would serve as the basis for the well-being criterion. Anderson's approach seems to be limited to the living conditions of salaried employees, whose situations are more or less clear and who are already organized in formal firms. Moreover, it appears that the solution is restricted to countries whose political and economic histories are similar to the one that Anderson expertly reconstructs. Consequently, this approach fails to acknowledge the historical and ongoing dependence of these economies on the intricate informality conditions that have existed since the beginning of colonization processes. These conditions include the well-known global garment and textile industry and its sweatshops; big and well-established consumer goods corporations that rely heavily on informal sellers for a large portion of their distribution; extractivism, whose most iconic and dramatic example is mining and the massive black market it creates; among many others. Hence, there are good reasons to believe that the phenomenon of informality in the economy is not directly caused by the implementation of what Anderson defines as a “conservative work ethic” but, rather, by a particular kind of exclusion (both voluntary and involuntary) that is scarcely analogous to the terms that are commonly used to characterize the socially disadvantageous conditions typical of neoliberalism, such as precariousness, oppression, exploitation, alienation, or poverty. However, rather than detracting from the many positive aspects of Anderson's book, these observations emphasize the need for additional theoretical research in this field.
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Countering the Pathologies of Recognition Towards an Inferentialist-Expressivist Strategy for Social Critique
(Associazione Pragma, 2025-01-01)
This paper explores the ambivalence of recognition within contemporary critical theory, moving beyond Althusser's conception of recognition as a purely ideological mechanism. Building on Honneth's analysis, it argues that recognition both reinforces social reproduction and enables self-realization, often in ways that are difficult to disentangle. The first section of the paper examines the claim that recognition, like any social practice, is structured by a system of norms that govern the reciprocal attribution of practical and moral attitudes, along with the commitments they entail. In the second section, I argue that inferential practices offer a powerful methodological framework for analyzing recognition claims, as they reveal tacit forms of knowledge and challenge the presumed immediacy of prevailing social categories. The third section explores the role of social struggles in articulating and advancing recognition demands, emphasizing the value of an inferentialist-expressivist perspective rooted in Robert Brandom's philosophy. I contend that inferentialism's foundations in Hegelian logic, phenomenology, and pragmatism provide critical resources for understanding the epistemic break with immediacy that underlies emancipatory forms of recognition, as well as for clarifying the logical structures of critique and normative transformation.
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