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Author: search.filters.author.Eduardo DargentSubject: search.filters.subject.Policy feedback

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    The limits of neoliberal policy feedback: Private pension fund reforms in Peru (2014–2021)
    (SAGE Publications Inc., 2022-08-01)
    A growing literature in comparative Latin American Politics highlights how policy feedback effects help explain the resilience of neoliberal reforms in the region. These works emphasize private actors/interest groups to explain neoliberal policy continuity. Nonetheless, given their focus on continuity, these works do little to explore other instances in which neoliberal feedback cannot preclude change. This paper presents an instance in which powerful private actors favored by neoliberal reforms were incapable of resisting change. An Act of the Peruvian Congress adopted in 2016 opened the door for individual pensioners to withdraw up to 95.5 percent of all their accumulated savings at the point of retirement. Ensuing reforms approved by Congress during the COVID-19 emergency (2020–2021) further weakened private administrators of these pension funds (AFPs). The case shows how the conflicting interests between private service providers and future pensioners make the service providers vulnerable; a divide also found in other neoliberal reforms.
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    The order behind disorder: informality, power, and the resilience of a transport policy trap in Lima, Peru
    (Elsevier BV, 2026-05-01)
    Massive internal migration in the sixties, a severe economic and social crisis in the eighties, and a radical neoliberal transport reform adopted in 1991 (Legislative Decree N° 651–1991) led to the emergence of a disorganized, inefficient, and costly transport system in Lima, Peru. In dialogue with the business power and policy feedback literature, we show that this system is rooted in the empowerment of leading private formal and informal transport actors and in the weakening of state transport control offices. These arrangements constitute what experts call a “policy trap,” a situation in which a trajectory is adopted that is difficult to escape due to prior reforms, public policies, and/or government decisions (Holland, 2017). This article analyzes two reform attempts to break the policy trap: the Integrated Transportation System (SIT) reform of 2011 and the creation of the Urban Transport Authority (ATU) in 2018. By focusing on the implementation of these reforms, we demonstrate the structural and instrumental power of informal and low-quality formal actors that sustain the system's continuity, particularly their successful strategies of resistance and adaptation to the reforms. We document how these actors engage politically to oppose the implementation of reforms, lobby and support political actors who can represent their interests, and adopt new modes of informal transport to circumvent or profit from the new conditions promoted by the reforms. These findings exemplify the considerable challenges that middle- and low-income states face in adopting and sustaining reforms to regulate informal activities, such as transport.
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