3. Producción

Browse

Search Results

Now showing 1 - 6 of 6

Some of the metrics are blocked by your
consent settings
Populists and technocrats in Latin America: Conflict, cohabitation, and cooperation
(Cogitatio Press, 2020-01-01)
The literature frequently presents populists and technocrats as antagonistic. Although undoubtedly there are good historical examples that confirm this tension, in this article we propose that the relations between economic technocrats and populists are less conflictive than usually assumed and cohabitation a more common outcome than expected. We argue that two conditions moderate conflict between populists and economic technocrats, leading not only to their cohabitation but to cooperation between them: the programmatic mandate of populists and the economic context of their rise to power. We analyse the relations of economic experts with nine populist presidents in contemporary Latin America to show this argument’s soundness.
Some of the metrics are blocked by your
consent settings
State Responses to the Gold Rush in the Andes (2004–2018): The Politics of State Action (and Inaction)
(Springer, 2020-12-01)
Abstract Despite many similarities, the gold rush that hit the Andean countries in 2004 elicited different state responses in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. Initially, there was a lack of enforcement of regulations towards informal mining, but eventually Colombia (2009) and later Peru (2011) enforced regulations with mixed results. Bolivia, on the other hand, has not enforced such regulations. At first, this may appear to be a matter of state capacity; however, a closer look uncovers different motivations behind these state actions (and inaction). We propose that the nature of social actors (or the lack of social actors) who profited from the gold boom, along with international and domestic pressures, are a crucial determinant of these different government responses. We explore this proposal through an analysis of the cases before and during the gold rush using a mix of archival research and interviews with key government actors. These findings allow us to distinguish empirically between forms of state inaction—standoff and forbearance—with distinct political consequences.
Some of the metrics are blocked by your
consent settings
The limits of neoliberal policy feedback: Private pension fund reforms in Peru (2014–2021)
(SAGE Publications Inc., 2022-08-01)
A growing literature in comparative Latin American Politics highlights how policy feedback effects help explain the resilience of neoliberal reforms in the region. These works emphasize private actors/interest groups to explain neoliberal policy continuity. Nonetheless, given their focus on continuity, these works do little to explore other instances in which neoliberal feedback cannot preclude change. This paper presents an instance in which powerful private actors favored by neoliberal reforms were incapable of resisting change. An Act of the Peruvian Congress adopted in 2016 opened the door for individual pensioners to withdraw up to 95.5 percent of all their accumulated savings at the point of retirement. Ensuing reforms approved by Congress during the COVID-19 emergency (2020–2021) further weakened private administrators of these pension funds (AFPs). The case shows how the conflicting interests between private service providers and future pensioners make the service providers vulnerable; a divide also found in other neoliberal reforms.
Some of the metrics are blocked by your
consent settings
The order behind disorder: informality, power, and the resilience of a transport policy trap in Lima, Peru
(Elsevier BV, 2026-05-01)
Massive internal migration in the sixties, a severe economic and social crisis in the eighties, and a radical neoliberal transport reform adopted in 1991 (Legislative Decree N° 651–1991) led to the emergence of a disorganized, inefficient, and costly transport system in Lima, Peru. In dialogue with the business power and policy feedback literature, we show that this system is rooted in the empowerment of leading private formal and informal transport actors and in the weakening of state transport control offices. These arrangements constitute what experts call a “policy trap,” a situation in which a trajectory is adopted that is difficult to escape due to prior reforms, public policies, and/or government decisions (Holland, 2017). This article analyzes two reform attempts to break the policy trap: the Integrated Transportation System (SIT) reform of 2011 and the creation of the Urban Transport Authority (ATU) in 2018. By focusing on the implementation of these reforms, we demonstrate the structural and instrumental power of informal and low-quality formal actors that sustain the system's continuity, particularly their successful strategies of resistance and adaptation to the reforms. We document how these actors engage politically to oppose the implementation of reforms, lobby and support political actors who can represent their interests, and adopt new modes of informal transport to circumvent or profit from the new conditions promoted by the reforms. These findings exemplify the considerable challenges that middle- and low-income states face in adopting and sustaining reforms to regulate informal activities, such as transport.
1
Some of the metrics are blocked by your
consent settings
From aspirational laws to the implementation of legislation against gender-based violence: bottom-up pressure in Peru and Argentina
(2025-03-15)
Gender-based violence is a rampant problem in Latin American countries. Historically, state policy to prevent and sanction it has developed slowly, usually having limited impact because of a lack of resources and political will. While the process of policy adoption involved feminist organizations and international norms diffusion, little is known about when and why policy to address gender-based violence can become a political priority. Based on a comparative case study of Peru and Argentina, we show that sustained mass mobilization was the key variable marking a turning point in both countries in state capacity building in that domain. The latter was importantly enhanced as a consequence of the Ni Una Menos protests. Through process-tracing analysis, we show that there was a substantial increase in state resources and personnel, as well as institutional innovation. This transformation occurred in response to the unprecedented mass mobilization of various sectors of society.
1
Some of the metrics are blocked by your
consent settings
Expert Knowledge in Democracies: Promises, Limits, and Conflict
(Annual Reviews, 2025-06-17)
The article reviews recent literature on bureaucratic experts as political actors in democracies, with a focus on their complex, sometimes conflictive relationships with politicians. First, we present the central promises of expertise for democratic governance: its alleged objectivity, responsiveness to the common good, and effectiveness. Then, we look into two criticisms of this optimistic and apolitical view: Expertise is neither as unbiased nor as effective as claimed. Building on a more political understanding of experts' power in democracies, we then discuss two topics that illustrate experts' relationships with politicians: ( a ) the conditions and political dynamics that cause changes in technical policy areas' influence, preferences, and institutional arrangements (or even experts' demise) and ( b ) how challenging experts' power is for democracy and elected politicians. We conclude with suggestions for future research and a call to find more common ground between the literatures focusing on experts and politics.
1

3. Producción

Browse

Filters

Settings

Sort By

Results per page

Search Results