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Item type:Publication, La objetividad de los valores en Husserl y Scheler. Una “disputa fenomenológica”(2021-02-11)De modo general, la posición de Husserl respecto de Scheler se puede resumir como el rechazo a una “metafísica ingenua”. Del otro lado, la posición de este respecto del fundador de la fenomenología se puede caracterizar como desaprobación al “giro trascendental” y al privilegio del pensar sobre el sentir y valorar. Pese a estas diferencias irreconciliables, Husserl y Scheler coinciden no solo en la defensa de la objetividad de los valores. En este texto, quisiéramos delinear los trazos generales de lo que sería una disputa fenomenológica entre Husserl y Scheler respecto de la objetividad axiológica con el fin de mostrar cómo sus análisis coinciden y divergen.In general terms, Husserl’s position regarding Scheler can be summarized as the rejection of a “naive metaphysics”. On the other hand, Scheler’s position regarding the father of Phenomenology can be presented as the disapproval of the “transcendental turn” and of the priority of thought over feeling and valuing. In spite of these irreconcilable differences, Husserl and Scheler agree in the defence of the objectivity of values. In this paper, we will try to draw some general guidelines of what a phenomenological dispute between Husserl and Scheler concerning the objectivity of values would be like in order to show how theirs analyses coincide, and disagree. - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, El camino del filósofo. Husserl y el sentido de la ética(2021-02-22)Las reflexiones de Husserl sobre la ética se caracterizan por el intento de hacer de ella una ciencia, pero terminan con la subordinación de los problemas éticos a la metafísica. Tomando como hilo conductor la reflexión husserliana sobre la ética en tanto Kunstlehre, el artículo intenta mostrar cómo el sentido y ámbito de la ética se van ampliando hasta el punto de que su subordinación a la metafísica responde al carácter ético que ha de tener la existencia del mundo y de la humanidad. Con este fin, seguimos el camino que va de la fundación estática de la ética de la primera lección de 1914 a la fundación genética de las lecciones de 1920/24 y terminamos con la consideración de dos textos del inicio de los años treinta en los que Husserl retoma la argumentación de estas últimas lecciones.Husserl’s meditations on ethics are characterized by his attempt to configure it as science, but they end by subordinating ethical problems to metaphysics. Starting by Husserl’s reflection on ethics as Kunstlehre, this paper attempts to show how the sense and scope of ethics expands to the point that its subordination to metaphysics responds to the ethical character that the world and humanity’s existence should both have. With this in view, this paper follows the path that leads from the static foundation of ethics in the first 1914 lessons, to its genetic foundation in the 1920/24 lessons. It concludes considering two texts from the beginning of the 1930’s, whereby Husserl deals again with the arguments of the latter lessons. - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Orden y desorden del corazón: apuntes schelerianos sobre los engaños valorativos(Catholic University of the Most Holy Conception, 2023-04-10)The moral value of our practical life depends on our knowledge of values. Moreover, according to Scheler, the adequate intuition of a fully given value necessarily motivates our will to the realization of that value. But it is rather the case that values of different kinds are given to us in varying degrees of inadequacy. For this reason, we are subject to possible value delusions and, therefore, to the possibility of an ethically bad life. In order to show the forms and sources of a priori identifiable value deception, this article addresses, first, the stratified correlation between values and intentional emotions on the basis of the Schelerian meanings of the concept of ordo amoris; secondly, it considers some “measures of knowledge” in order to distinguish two major types of disorder of the ordo amoris based on different forms of delusions or illusions of feeling, preferring and loving.